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Abstract 
The history of development is well provided with examples of beliefs which, though 
sincerely held by professionals in the social and natural sciences, have later come to be 
seen as ill-founded or wrong. Nine examples help to explain the tendency for 
questionable and erroneous beliefs and policies to be robustly resilient. Interactions of 
power, interests and mindsets, and of behaviour and experiences, play a part in generating 
and maintaining myth and error. Critical epistemological awareness to offset and correct 
misleading influences of professional, institutional and personal interests and orientations 
is proposed for a more prominent role in good science and policy, and for enhancing the 
impact of impact evaluations. Questions for self-critical reflection are proposed. The 
reader is invited to improve on these. 
Contents 
Prologue 
Rationale, purpose and method 
Nine cases 
1. The Green Revolution turning red 
2. The Green Revolution and CDR farming 
3. Warabandi in India 
4. The Madagascar System of Rice Intensification (SRI) 
5. The fuel wood crisis in Africa 
6. Desertification 
7. The Forest-Savanna Mosaic in West Africa 
8. Population, soil erosion and fertility 
9.. Ujamaa in Tanzania 
The genesis, and maintenance of myth and error: 
1 The usual disclaimers about responsibility being mine apply. This draft has been completed during travel 
without access to all the sources. It is work in progress. I shall be grateful to anyone able and willing to 
contribute suggestions for improvement, criticisms and/or corrections. My address is Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. Tel (44) 1273 606 261. Fax (44) 
1273 621202 . Email r.chambers@ids.ac.uk 
Power, interests and mindsets 
Behaviour and experiences 
Ignorance 
Overlooking history 
Selective visits, presentations and perceptions 
Extrapolating from local to global 
Repeating narratives, stories and statistics 
Public relations, speeches and soundbites 
Dealing with unwelcome information 
Concluding 
Lessons for the impact of impact evaluation 
Lessons for good science 
Self-critical reflection: a code of questions? 
Prologue 
A theme of this paper is that we - social and natural scientists - should be transparent and 
self-critically reflective about our orientations and predispositions. To be consistent, I 
have to start with myself so that the reader can see where I am coming from. I like to 
pose as a natural scientist in origin, but that was only in secondary school, followed by 
undergraduate history and then post-graduate public administration. In the practical and 
academic worlds I have survived largely in the gaps between disciplines. As in this 
paper, I am interested in connections between ideas, values, methods, behaviours and 
what we perceive and believe. Looking for gaps, errors and omissions in "normal" 
professional beliefs and practices, and suggesting how to correct them, has contributed to 
a reasonably sustainable livelihood. However, I am conditioned and predisposed to select 
cases for analysis which fit and exploit this interstitial niche. This means that I am 
vulnerable to exaggerating the weaknesses of mainstream science and to undervaluing its 
achievements. I try to balance somewhere between the negative academic and the 
positive practitioner. I believe that our knowledge of the world is partial and 
provisional, much of it formed interactively through personal and institutional 
interactions, interests and predispositions. I try to embrace an eclectic pluralism 
informed by doubt and self-doubt, distrusting fundamentalisms whether religious, 
political, positivist, green or alternative. I have often been wrong, and am likely to be 
wrong again, including in some of what follows. 
This is not a normal way to start a paper. The question is whether it is a distraction, or 
whether it, or something like it, can help readers to come to their own judgements about 
the assertions and views which follow.. I invite and welcome critical feedback. 
Rationale, Purpose and Method 
The rationale for this paper is the history we have of debate, error and distortion in the 
relationships between science, beliefs, policy and action. In some areas of development 
concerned with agriculture, natural resources and the environment, these debates, errors 
and distortions have been marked. To be sure, there have been many successes. But the 
number, scale and importance of areas of debate and of apparent error are so big that 
finding ways to diminish them would seem to deserve widespread attention. Learning 
and changing as a result of impact evaluations is one way. The question is what other 
courses of action, on their own or as part of impact evaluation processes, can contribute. 
The purpose here is to look for ways to do better, expecting these to be through many 
actions in different domains, with successive approximations to fit ever-transient realities, 
rather than through scales-from-the-eyes or revolutionary transformations. 
The method is selective empiricism. I take cases I know of, or which are accessible in 
the literature, where received wisdom has been challenged and qualified. My 
predisposition to find the challenges credible needs to be born in mind. The reader is 
referred especially to the sources as an aid to making judgements. From these cases I 
draw lessons about some ways error originates and is sustained, and how it may be 
avoided and reduced. 
The examples we are concerned with are paradigmatic in the sense that they concern 
patterns of ideas, beliefs, values, methods and behaviours which are mutually supporting. 
Not all of them imply binary either-or polarisation, or what psychologists call "slot-
rattling" (as when a Marxist becomes a Catholic, or when a CIA agent becomes an 
international terrorist). Rather many of them are less dramatic, with small changes and 
reconfigurations modifying views and actions. Indeed, the very polarisation of positions 
inherent in some of the classic paradigm shifts generates and sustains defensiveness and 
denial which are barriers to the small steps that often cumulatively lead to better policy 
and practice. As Norman Uphoff (1992) has argued, both-and thinking often gets closer 
to reality and is more constructive than either-or thinking. 
Nine Cases 
Examples are numerous. Their wide variety spans the Integrated Rural Development 
Projects of the 1970s, beliefs about human calorie requirements, understandings of the 
nature and causes of famines, the scale of post-harvest losses of grain, and the feasibility 
of multi-purpose animal-drawn wheeled toolcarriers (for analysis and sources for these 
see Chambers 1997: 17-32). And readers will be able to add others. 
For illustration, and to provide additional material, nine cases can be outlined. These are 
of myths, misperceptions, denials and errors concerning field realities, policies and 
practices. Succinct summary oversimplifies and is vulnerable to precisely the unsubtle 
soundbites which I criticise later, and some of the detail may be open to debate, but the 
purpose is to provide an overview of context for later analysis and illustration. 
1. The Green Revolution turning red 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s it was quite commonly supposed by political scientists 
and social anthropologists that the green revolution was accentuating division and 
conflict (see e.g. Wharton 1969; Frankel 1971; Byres 1972; Mencher 1974 and for 
critiques Harriss 1977 and Chambers 1984). Larger farmers were seen to be benefitting to 
the detriment of smaller farmers and farm labourers. This was leading to class 
polarisation and violence. "The green revolution turning red" became a catchphrase 
representing this set of beliefs. 
The green revolution did not turn red. As the new seeds and practices spread, smaller 
farmers with access to irrigation came to benefit more (Hazell and Ramasamy; Farmer 
1977). Class polarisation and violence did not emerge as major impacts. Patterns varied 
but agricultural wages generally rose. 
2. The Green Revolution and CDR fanning 
In the early stages of the green revolution in India, a belief was prevalent among 
scientists that its yield and production benefits could be spread widely through 
combinations of conditions and actions, especially infrastructure and services (see e.g. 
Mosher 19 ). The Intensive Agricultural District Programme (IADP) was designed to 
achieve this through agricultural extension, input supply and other measures in districts 
selected for their good infrastructure and irrigation. More generally, the top-down centre-
outwards package and transfer-of-technology approach was seen as the way to transform 
agriculture. 
Even in the IADP Districts, adoption and benefits were disappointing in the early stages 
(Brown 1971). Controllable conditions, especially irrigation, were critical. More 
widely, the transfer of the technology in the form of modernising packages did not fit 
well with the problems and opportunities of much small (CDR = complex, diverse and 
risk-prone) farming. There is a continuing debate, for example concerning the Sasakawa 
Global 2000 (SG 20000) transfer-of-technology programme promoted in Africa by 
Norman Borlaug, Jimmy Carter and others. The balance of opinion and practice has 
shifted towards more diversified approaches with farmer participatory research, baskets 
of choice and the transfer of principles as means towards sustainable agricultural 
development. 
3. Warabandi in India 
The Indian Eighth Five Year Plan set the target of 8 million hectares of canal irrigation to 
be brought under the Northwest Indian warabandi system of timed proportional 
distribution of water. 
The warabandi system can work with the conjuncture of four conditions: clear land 
rights, low rainfall, field channels which lead to individual fields, and most critically, 
ungated outlets with a high full supply level in canals to assure a reasonably constant 
flow through the outlet. These conditions rarely if ever apply together outside Northwest 
India. The programme was a disastrous flop.2 
4. The Madagascar System of Rice Intensification (SRI) 
2 1 have presented more detail supporting these bald assertions in Managing Canal Irrigation pp xx-xx 
The Madagascar System of Rice Intensification (SRI), evolved by Father Henri de 
Laulanie, entails simultaneous radical changes in cultivation practices which are 
traditional world-wide for both farmers and scientists. The changes include veery early 
transplanting, minimising transplanting trauma, transplanting single seedlings not 
clumps, wide spacing, aeration of roots, and weeding with a roller. With these practices, 
plant architecture above and below ground is dramatically different, tillers proliferate, 
and yields rise sharply, usually by a half or more, sometimes doubling or trebling, and on 
occasion reaching over 20 tons/hectare, exceeding what scientists have believed to be the 
biological maximum potential.3 
WARDA and IRRI have evidently4 reacted slowly. Reportedly only the social 
anthropologist at IRRI is doing any research on SRI. It is, however, being adopted and 
spreading steadily not only in Madagascar, but also in Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. 
5. The Fuelwood Crisis in Africa 
In the 1970s and 1980s it was believed that much of SubSaharan Africa faced a severe 
fuel crisis and that in many areas fuelwood would run out. Standard analysis using 
"woodfuel gap theory", subtracting projected consumption from projected production, led 
to scenarios which could be caricatured as, for instance, that the last tree in Tanzania 
would disappear in 1990. 
The belief was successfully challenged (Leach and Mearns 1988). Demand had been 
overestimated and supply and substitutions underestimated. The pattern varies but in 
general the crisis has not happened, and in quite extensive areas woody biomass has 
become more plentiful. Examples are parts of Kenya such as Machakos District (Tiffen 
et al 1993) and Central Province where it has been rising by over 4 per cent per annum 
(Ambio source to be added). 
6. Desertification 
The mainstream desertification narrative flourished in the 1970s and 1980s. A standard 
statement was that each year 6 million hectares of land were being "irretrievably lost 
through various forms of desertification or destroyed to desert-like conditions" and 21 
million hectares annually were being reduced to zero or even negative productivity 
(UNEP 1984 cited in Swift 1997: 81, and repeated in the Brundtland Report and 
elsewhere). The process was attributed largely or entirely to human activity. One 
recommendation for Africa was draconian controls and massive reafforestation. 
3 See for example Uplioff and Combs, Uphoff et al, Stoop, Uphoff and Kassam in press. For further 
sources contact Norman Uphoff at Cornell NTU1 @cornell.edu 
"Evidently" means that this is based on verbal communications which I have not verified, and which I 
hope will be confirmed, qualified or refuted at this conference 
A counter-narrative has now gained wide acceptance. According to this, the variable 
most affecting primary productivity is not human use but rainfall. The counter-narrative 
"combines ideas of indigenous technical knowledge and customary institutions, including 
common property management rules; it points to recent studies showing the high 
productivity of extensive nomadic pastoralism, and the excellent adaptations farmers and 
herders in the drylands have made to the vagaries of dynamic, event-driven ecosystems" 
(Swift 1997: 90) 
7. The Forest-Savanna Mosaic in West Africa 
Through colonial times and until recently scientists and administrators in Guinea (and 
latterly also donors) believed that the forest islands in the forest-savanna transition zone 
were relics of a much more extensive forest. Human activity, including burning, had 
been responsible for turning forest into savanna. 
Meticulous research drawing on many sources, including travellers' journals, oral 
histories, time series aerial photographs, and analysis of forest species composition and 
age, has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that the reverse is true: that through 
cultivation, judicious burning, and planting and protecting trees, people seek to extend 
the forests around their settlements, and that this holds also in the same zone elsewhere in 
West Africa (Fairhead and Leach 1996, and subsequent publications). 
8. Population, soil erosion and fertility 
A Malthusian narrative has been and remains widely disseminated about population and 
the environment, especially in SubSaharan Africa but also with much small farming and 
pastoralism in other parts of the world. In this view, increased population leads to 
vicious circles of deforestation, cultivation of more marginal land, shorter fallows, loss of 
fertility, erosion, degradation, declining yields, overgrazing and a food gap. 
Numerous local-level studies have challenged and qualified this view (see e.g. Tiffen et 
al 1993, Stocking 1996, Keeley and Scoones (forthcoming) for Africa; and Ives 1987, 
Carson 1992, Gill 1993 and Tamang 1993 for Nepal)5. Much local variation and many 
counter-examples have come to light where increased population has contributed to 
intensification and greater sustainability of agriculture (for example through terracing, 
agroforestry, agropastoralism, double-digging, fish farming, cover crops, horticulture, 
composting, manuring and other forms of nutrient management). The picture emerging is 
of a patchwork of diverse conditions where the least questionable universal generalisation 
may be that universal generalisations are likely to mislead. 
9. Ujamaa in Tanzania 
In the national programme of ujamaa in Tanzania the intention was to move towards an 
ideal of collective agriculture in every village. The programme had a high political 
5 For a summary and discussion of the evidence see Whose Reality Counts? ( Chambers 1997): 23-29 
profile. For a time there was a common belief that it could and would achieve some 
success. 
Many villages cultivated a small common plot to show to party officials and visitors. 
Perceptive research by political science students at the University of Dar es Salaam on 
vacation, edited by Proctor and published with the ironic but diplomatic title Building 
Uiamaa in Tanzania revealed, in contrast, a reality that was unpopular, with degrees of 
coercion, resistance and non-implementation. The programme was eventually 
abandoned. 
Caveats 
Before drawing on these cases, three caveats or disclaimers are in order. 
1. If we accept all knowledge as contingent and provisional, this applies also to the 
"corrected" versions of the myths or errors. There is unlikely to be any final or simple 
truth. 
2. I have in part selected the cases to illustrate points I already had in mind. 
3. The interpretations which follow are "work-in-progress" and in no sense final 
conclusions. I am hoping that critical comment, corrections and suggestions at this 
conference will lead to a later and better-grounded analysis. 
The Genesis and Maintenance of Myth and Error 
The genesis and maintenance of myth and error will be analysed at two levels: a general 
level of power, interests and mindsets; and a more particular level of behaviours and 
experiences. 
1. Power, interests and mindsets 
Power refers especially power to reward, recognise or dismiss and penalise. It has 
manifestations which are interpersonal, institutional and professional. In their seminal 
book Lie of the Land, Leach and Mearns conclude that it is "hierarchical relations of 
power between various participating actors, which, lead to convergences of commitments 
that coalesce in certain dominant directions" that account for " the remarkable continuity 
in received wisdom about environmental change in Africa" (1997: 28). A case has been 
made that "all power deceives"6. 
Interests refers to personal and institutional motivations, benefits and disbenefits. These 
include patronage and funding from foundations, governments, international agencies or 
the private sector; institutional survival and growth; personal income, prestige, 
recognition and international travel; and creative and moral satisfactions from good work 
and changing things for the better. Obvious examples of institutional interests can be 
found with multinationals dealing in fertilisers, pesticides and GM crops. Combinations 
of interests can be especially potent. With desertification, for example, as Swift (1997: 
6 See chapter 5 in Whose Reality Counts? which has this title 
86-89) has persuasively argued, national governments in Africa, international aid 
bureaucracies, and some bilateral donors and some groups of scientists, all had common 
interests in promoting the narrative. With the Madagascar System of Rice Intensification 
it is easy to interpret and understand the slow response of CG Centres when they are 
professionally and institutionally committed to other approaches and lack the resources 
for rapid changes of programme and priority. 
Mindsets is used to cover personal and professional orientations, ideologies and 
predispositions, including ways of seeing and interpreting things. They are conditioned 
by professional training, for example through textbooks, lectures and examinations in 
colleges and universities, through methods and the behaviours and findings which derive 
from them, through professional norms and the policies of journal editors, and more 
generally through current beliefs, fashions and ideologies. Neo-Marxist ideology and 
frames of analysis were in vogue among radicals at the time when the political scientists 
and social anthropologists who were looking for evidence of the green revolution turning 
red. Modernism and a belief in the top-down transfer of technology were widely 
accepted at the time of the green revolution, together with a belief that non-adopters of 
innovations were irrational laggards. African socialism and a desire to build on 
traditional African values of sharing and community predisposed Nyerere and other 
leaders and thinkers to advocate and promote ujamaa vijijini. In Swift 's interpretation, 
national governments in Africa in the 1970s were seeking "to rescue an ideology, 
already failing at that time, of authoritarian intervention in rural land use: 
"desertification" was the crisis scenario they used to claim rights to stewardship over, 
resources previously outside their control" (Swift 1997: 86). In these cases ideologies 
and mindsets, often combined with interests, can be seen to have predisposed observers 
or policy-makers to promote the ideas, interpretations and policies which were 
subsequently found to be misguided. 
2. Combinations of Behaviours ancl Experiences 
The array of behaviours and experiences which can sustain and reinforce myths and 
errors, and rejections of alternatives, is impressive. Combined they can be quite 
formidable. 
Ignorance. With hindsight it can be seen that those who thought that green revolution 
packages could be widely adopted did not appreciate the realities and rationality of CDR 
farming practices. Those who thought that warabandi could spread to irrigation outside 
the Northwest of India did not know the four preconditions for its operation, or that they 
hardly ever prevailed in other parts of India. Those who calculated the fuelwood gaps in 
Africa did not take into account that much fuelwood comes from clearing land for 
agriculture, that shrubs, bushes, twigs and leaves provide fuel, that when fuelwood grows 
scarce people economise and substitute other fuels, and that much fuel is dead not living 
wood. Those who promoted ujamaa in Tanzania did not appreciate the strength of the 
family as the unit for which people will work and make sacrifices or the strength of 
resistance to central interference in family and community life. 
Overlooking history. Ignorance of history is a widespread factor. The past is easily and 
often overlooked by outside observers, researchers and visitors. This was true of "the 
green revolution turning red". As John Harriss pointed out (1977: 35), the much-cited 
Kilvenmanai incident in Thanjavur in 1968, in which 43 Harijans were massacred, was 
not a new phenomenon: such incidents had been described by a social anthropologist, 
Kathleen Gough, twenty years earlier. Leach and Mearns (1996), in their critique of 
received wisdom about the environment in Africa, stressed "the exclusion of historical 
data from much ecological science" as a weakness. And a variety of forms of historical 
evidence and insight were crucial in leading Fairhead and Leach (1996), and their 
colleagues, to overturn the deforestation myth of the forest-savanna transition zone in _ 
West Africa. 
Selective visits, presentations and perceptions. 
The biases of "rural development tourism" are not a new discovery. The visitor is taken 
to a special place which has had special treatment, and is treated to special presentations 
by people who have been specially trained and briefed and who have often done it often 
before7. The story line in each case is well rehearsed and guides have embedded it like a 
catechism, sometimes through almost daily repetition. The role call of special projects 
visited around the world is lengthy: in India three stand out - Sukhomajri, Mohini, and 
Ralegaon Sindhi, all of which have received quite extraordinary attention. A key 
moment in the history of SG 2000 in Ethiopia is widely recognised to have been a field 
visit in September 1994 by Meles Zenawi, already in power and subsequently Prime 
Minister, together with Norman Borlaug and Jimmy Carter (Keeley and Scoones 
forthcoming chapter 4). It is hardly likely that they were taken to a farmer who was 
failing. An Ethiopian informant (who did not wish to be named) told me that one farmer 
visited had a magnificent crop which had received three times the recommended dose of 
fertiliser. With strong political support from the top, the Ethiopian Government 
subsequently scaled up S-G 2000 to a national campaign with a plan for 1999 of reaching 
4 million farmers (Howard et al 1998 cited in Keeley and Scoones chapter 4). Or in 
Tanzania, Mbioni, the contemporary journal of Kivukoni College in Dar es Salaam, 
published accounts of ujaniaa based on repeated visits to three exceptional communities 
- Upper Kitete, Mbambara and the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). These 
were probably almost the only instances of successful collective agriculture, and all three 
were idiosyncratically non-replicable: Upper Kitete was on a land frontier with 
economies of scale with wheat and cattle, and a capable and committed manager; 
Mbambara was a sisal estate taken over by it workers when its owner abandoned it; and 
the RDA, in a very poor and isolated area, was unique for its two charismatic and 
ideologically committed leaders and its communalism (Mbioni, various issues). Of all 
the thousands of supposed ujaniaa villages in Tanzania he might have visited, Julius 
Nyerere twice went to the RDA. Not surprisingly it was some years before the failure of 
the ujamaa was recognised and it was abandoned. 
7 One indicator is to ask a presenter how many times s/he has done it before. What "it" is may itself have 
changed. A Nepali Forester has told me that on approaching a village [probably near Kathmandu] a man 
came out to meet him with a piece of paper and at once began drawing a map. "Have you done this 
before?" "Oh at least a hundred times" (pers. comm. Yam Malla) 
Extrapolating from local to regional and global 
Simple narratives and statistics are often derived by scaling up from local research. 
Good research scientists hedge their findings with caveats and qualifications. They can 
then be horrified when they find figures taken out of context, generalised for regions or 
even the globe, and repeatedly quoted to justify policies and programmes. Keeley and 
Scoones8 (in draft, chapter 3) point out that aggregated Africa-wide nutrient balance 
figures have been based on extrapolations from a limited amount of work carried out in 
small areas in a few African countries. They quote "a recent and widely-circulated 
Bulletin of the American Soil Science Society on soil fertility" which cites "Smaling's 
seminal work" to indicate that an average of 660 kg N per year, 75 kg P ha per year, and 
450 kg K per year during the last 30 years has been lost from about 200 million ha of 
cultivated land in 37 African countries (Sanchez et al 1997:4). Yet Smaling et al (1997: 
50-52) comment on their work that "The studies were often done at the mini-plot level, 
the results of which cannot be linearly scaled up to the watershed" (let alone, one might 
add, to 200 million ha in 37 countries). One soil scientist said of a research study "When 
we wrote it we added umpteen footnotes and qualifications which seemed to get lost as 
the figures were taken up." 
A second example is the short ecological reconnaissance carried out by Hugh Lamprey in 
about three weeks in 1975 in the north-western Sudan. His comparison of conditions 
with an earlier ecological survey was used by others to extrapolate that for the whole 
southern fringe of the Sahara there was a 6 km per annum southward movement of desert. 
A later study found tha t " There was a severe drought impact on crop yield during the 
Sahelian drought 1965-74 in the Sudan followed by significant recovery as soon as the 
rains returned" (Hellden 1991: 379, cited in Swift 1997: 84). 
Repeating narratives, stories and statistics. 
Simple, striking and memorable narratives, stories and statistics become powerful and 
persuasive through repetition. 
Dominant narratives are reviewed by Keeley and Scoones (forthcoming). An example is 
the neo-Malthusian vicious circle of population increase, environmental degradation and 
a growing food gap. Narratives tend to embody simple relationships, occluding local 
complexities, qualifications and exceptions. The linearity of sentences constrains 
expression and thought to simple cause-effect relationships which are then generalised. 
Unlike diagrams, words do not readily permit the presentation of multiple causality or 
local diversity. Concepts and relationships are then simplified and streamlined in ways 
which fail adequately to represent realities. 
8 In this paragraph and elsewhere I am grateful to James Keeley and Ian Scoones for ideas and for sharing 
with me chapters f rom their draft book on understanding environmental policy processes in Africa. 
For their part, stories have been identified as a powerful way of changing organisations 
and their cultures (Denning 2000). They can also reinforce beliefs. "Good" stories, 
whether true, representative or not, get repeated and spread on their own. Much of the 
"evidence" that the green revolution was turning red was the single Kilvenmanai incident 
(cited, for example, in Frankel 1971: 115-6; and Wharton 1969). Much was made of this. 
But as John Harriss (1977: 35) observed "The Kilvenmanai incident...has been made the 
basis for optimistic predictions about the likelihood of "the green revolution turning red" 
by a kind of "rapportage overkill" which has used one incident many times over as 
evidence of the imminence of revolution". 
The same is true of certain statistics which are simple, memorable, remembered and 
repeated. That post-harvest grain losses at the village level were 30 or 40 percent was 
striking and shocking when the figure was propagated. Although much careful field-
level research showed these estimates to be grossly inaccurate and misleading (Greeley 
1987), and in part derived from a time-of-harvesting trial at IRRI (de Padua 1976), they 
were widely repeated at conferences and workshops and led to major misallocations of 
resources. That desertification was spreading at the rate of 6 million hectares a year was 
easy to remember and quote, and became embedded in the environmental discourse 
through its use by UNEP and the Brundtland Commission. The same was true of the 
figure of 6 million hectares of land in India said to be waterlogged from irrigation, a 
figure which statistical archaeology found to be spurious (Chambers 1988). 
Repeating narratives, stories and statistics embeds them like rote learning. Catechists and 
teachers are well aware of the importance of repetition for internalising knowledge and 
beliefs. Repeated often enough they become simplified, losing their qualifications, and 
are then embedded and believed. This may occur especially among those who speak in 
public about their subjects, and do this in a mode of advocacy. How profound a disability 
public repetition can be is barely recognised, despite its many pathological manifestations 
among politicians of whatever persuasion9. 
Public relations, soundbites and speeches 
Myths are also established and reinforced through public relations activities. Annual 
reports, videos to introduce visitors to institutions, and activities of public relations firms 
all contribute. Professionally, the latter are concerned to please their clients by 
propagating whatever their message may be and establishing whatever image they wish. 
They also seek to minimise criticism. An SG 2000 meeting was convened in London, 
9 1 have been horrified to catch myself out. In PRA-related workshops I have for several years been 
recounting an example of participatory mapping, reported by Jules Pretty, in an Indian village. I have been 
saying that four separate groups came up with populations of 312, 312, 316 and 321. 316 was found to 
have double-counted a household of 4, but 321 had included an outcast household of 9 on the edge of the 
village. I was deeply shocked to find that the actual figures (Chambers 1997: 145) were 239, 239, 242 and 
247. On some occasion I may have said "the figures were something l ike. . . ." but then later repeated them 
without the qualification. Also the extra people were three not four, and not in one household but divided 
between three households, and the extra family had five members not nine. The point is that I really 
believed 312,312,316 and 321 and the story I was telling. One wonders how many more serious examples 
could be found. 
and organised by a public relations consultant. Ambassadors and High Commissioners 
from African countries were invited. The programme was organised with only 15 
minutes for questions and discussion, from 1300 - 1315, with lunch pending1 . 
Soundbites, too, have their part to play. The green revolution turning red, the desert on 
the move, the food gap widening - these are phrases that catch on. Speechwriters play a 
part here. They need catchy and simple messages. They know what needs to be said, for 
whatever political or institutional reasons. And as asserted above, those who then speak 
the messages internalise and remember them. 
Dealing with unwelcome information 
Information can be unwelcome which threatens policies, institutions, funding, research 
programmes, or personal or institutional reputations or prestige. Such discordant, 
threatening or "unhelpful" information can be dealt with in several ways, among them 
rejection, denial, confidentiality, or ignoring, shelving, or postponing consideration. 
Rejection and denial allow scope for progress through debate. Secrecy though can be 
very damaging. Hugh Lamprey's influential 1975 report on desertification "remained 
unpublished - indeed was treated as confidential- for at least a decade after it was written, 
but its conclusions were widely cited" (Swift 1996: 78). One is reminded of the refusal 
of access to the skull of Piltdown man as a result of which it took long for it to be 
revealed as a hoax. Lamprey's report was not a hoax, but it seems likely that had access 
to it been open, the weakness of the desertification narrative would have been easier to 
appreciate. 
Ignoring, shelving and postponing are best illustrated from my own less than impeccable 
behaviour. When responsible for coordinating evaluation for the Kenya Special Rural 
Development Programme in 1969-71 1 believed gravity reticulation water projects were a 
very good thing. A sociologist (Padfield) wrote a think-piece which raised perceptive 
cautions and criticisms. I feared that these would threaten the substantive programme. I 
remember that after glancing at the paper I did not even want to read what he had written, 
let alone pass it on to others, and again and again postponed properly considering and 
discussing it. 
For obvious reasons, such behaviour usually goes unacknowledged. Findings or ideas 
which are discordant, unwelcome or potentially damaging pose threats that may be 
personal or institutional or both. It is especially difficult for people or institutions with 
heavy commitments of funding and high profile programmes (SG 2000's package 
programmes, India's warabandi, IRRI's research to produce a "golden rice", and 
Tanzania's programme of ujamaa come to mind) to accept other good or better 
approaches, even if they are complementary rather than competitive. Those concerned 
deserve understanding and sympathy, given their personal and institutional investments, 
if they find it difficult to admit error or change course. To do so may be made more 
10 This was so inadequate for any serious discussion that I and at least one other who had received 
invitations decided not to participate. 
difficult when the alternatives, as is usual, are less clearcut, more diverse, and harder to 
"sell". Nevertheless, the costs of such behaviour can be high indeed. 
Concluding 
Alone, any one of these tendencies might not be too difficult to overcome. Combined 
they can take off into strongly self-sustaining myth. When power, interests, mindsets, 
behaviours and experiences variously combine in support, myths and errors can be 
difficult to dispel and correct. The biases towards repeating and remembering simple 
narratives compounds the problems. In Swift 's (1997: 85) words "A simple idea, 
adorned with powerful slogans, proves remarkably hard to change, even when shown to 
be patently inaccurate". 
A final illustration can come from Starkey's (1988) scholarly and sobering study of 
multi-purpose wheeled toolcarriers. These received considerable publicity, not least from 
ICRISAT where there was a considerable investment of professional time and resources. 
Worldwide, Starkey found that over 45 designs had been made, but that of the 10,000 or 
so toolcarriers produced the number ever used by farmers was negligible. When he 
corresponded with those who were developing and testing toolcarriers a common reply 
was that they were facing difficulties but they knew they had been successful elsewhere. 
None of these appreciated the extent to which they, were deceived. All were victims of a 
collective fantasy. 
The lesson from all these examples is the importance of ground truth. The huge challenge 
is for policy and commitment to accommodate and reflect the diversity, complexity and 
dynamism of the real world. And as is increasingly accepted, much ground truth is best 
learnt by enabling local people themselves to express, analyse and share their realities 
and priorities. 
Lessons for the Impact of Impact Evaluation 
The impact of impact evaluation depends on the significance of findings. It also depends 
on credibility and the nature of the receiving environment. 
Lessons for the impact of impact evaluation can be described at three levels. 
The first is professional and methodological. Participatory methods and approaches have 
been through a phase of explosive innovation, not least in PM and E (Participatory 
Monitoring and Evaluation) (see e.g. Estrella et al 2000). They have been widely 
regarded as limited to qualitative research. There is now, however, much evidence and 
many examples of participatory approaches and methods generating numbers, and an 
argument that they are a means to the "best of both worlds", combining the advantages of 
both qualitative and quantitative work and findings (Chambers 2002). 
A question here is whether impact evaluation studies are vulnerable to being unduly 
conservative. We can ask whether there is here a Kuhnian (Kuhn 1962) paradigmatic 
tension between normal science and a new approach. It is understandable that established 
methods are used in impact evaluation for the sake of credibility. It can be asked, though, 
whether the methods are not recognised, accepted and adopted for reasons similar to the 
lack of interest in the Madagascar SRI. There is an argument for working on the trade-
offs between conventional credibility (for example through questionnaire surveys, with 
their many shortcomings) and other methods which promise greater accuracy and insight 
but are less accepted. 
The second level is the institutional receiving environment and interests. The impact of 
impact evaluation depends not only on the credibility of the research, the mode of 
presentation and the extent to which is can be reduced to simple messages with 
implications for policy and action, but also on the politics, interests and interactions of 
actors and institutions. 
The third level is personal, in terms of mindsets, ideologies, predispositions, experiences 
and behaviours. To what extent findings are received, understood, internalised and acted 
upon may depend critically on a few influential individuals and what they accept and do. 
Lessons for Good Science 
The question here is where one draws the boundaries of "good science". They can be 
drawn narrowly around normal methodology and norms for the presentation of results. 
Perhaps few would wish nowadays to be so narrow. If social responsibility, policy 
influence and poverty impact are included, then good science has to involve critical 
reflection on the issues explored above. What has been called "self-critical 
epistemological awareness", reflecting on what we see, how we think, how we learn and 
unlearn, what we believe, and what motivates and conditions what we perceive, select, 
stress and represent, can be argued to be a vital, if neglected, element in good science. 
How much self-critical epistemological awareness is there in the CG system? How much 
is it rewarded or penalised? How could it be penalised less and rewarded more? 
Self-critical Reflection: a Code of Questions? 
Natural and social scientists reading so far may be inclined to exclude themselves from 
these errors. My question then would be whether myths and errors are not part of the 
human condition. Activities covered by the strict codes of rigour of accepted scientific 
method constitute a fairly well defined zone amenable to protection. But so much of 
practice related to science, as in the examples in this paper, lies outside that zone. Just as 
there are rules for good scientific experimentation, we can ask whether there should also 
be rules, a code, for the messier and more error prone zones outside the laboratory and off 
the research station. Many such have been proposed, not least for field visits and 
interactions with farmers (going back to Robert Rhoades' (1982) classic The Art of the 
Informal Agricultural Survey) and now including participatory research with and by 
farmers. The literature that I can recall, though, pays little or no attention to the 
dimension of self-critical epistemological reflection. 
Each of us might have our own list of questions that we could ask ourselves, quite 
frequently, in the course of work and decisions. Here are some, for discussion and 
improvement: 
> What do my disciplinary training, research commitments and career and institutional 
interests predispose me to look for, see, select, accept, believe and disseminate? 
> What am I conversely predisposed to overlook, not notice, reject, and disbelieve? 
> What facts, views or simplified ideas have I internalised through selective 
experiences, and internalised, simplified and stripped of qualifications through 
unchallenged repetition? 
> Am I disabled by power from being able to learn? 
> What would be threatened if I were to change my view? 
> What alternative or more nuanced views are there, and who holds them? 
> Can I argue their case against mine? 
> When I do, does my original view change? 
If those involved in the cases cited had seriously asked themselves these questions, would 
or could some of the errors and misguided policies have been avoided? 
In sum, is self-critical epistemological awareness an essential part of good evaluation and 
of good science? 
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